

THESE DAYS

—By George Sokolsky—

Referring to China, in his "State of the Union" message, President Eisenhower said:

"... We shall continue military and economic aid to the Nationalist government of China."

The single reference to the subject evoked great applause from the Congress, but only after the message had been carefully read did it become clear that not one word was said about the more critical question of the American policy toward Communist China. Regarding this, President Eisenhower did not say what American policy is.

Referring to South Asia, President Eisenhower said:

"In South Asia, profound changes are taking place in free nations which are demonstrating their ability to progress thru democratic methods. They provide an inspiring contrast to the dictatorial methods and backward course of events in Communist China..."

Red China

This does not answer the question of recognition of Communist China. It is no secret that an effort was made out of Washington to give the impression that Vice President Nixon, after his return from the Far East, favored such recognition. Nixon, realizing what was being done, hit out straight by a total denial of his support for such recognition. He said that he opposed it. Republican Senate Majority Leader William F. Knowland, in a "Meet the Press" discussion last Sunday, most emphatically opposed recognition either by the United States or the United Nations.

A factor in this situation is Arthur H. Dean, our most recent negotiator at Panmunjom and law partner in Sullivan and Cromwell of both John Foster Dulles, secretary of state, and Allen Dulles, head of the C.I.A. Dean has gone thru a harrowing experience with the Chinese Communists at Panmunjom. Undoubtedly he was sent on this mission because of his close relations to the secretary of state and his ability as a negotiator. He had also been associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. In a letter to Clayton Lane, executive secretary of the institute, as recently as April 18, 1949, he wrote:

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"I realize that you have come into an exceptionally difficult situation, but I think we might go back to the publications of the institute and with the help of Larry Rosinger point out the difficulties our State department is now facing in attempting to get up a constructive policy for China."

In this same letter, he said the following:

"I hope you won't get discouraged. It is tough, but I think worth while. You have my complete support but (1) I would not mention the Communist attack in relation to I.P.R. publications, (2) for income tax as well as policy reasons I would not indicate we are engaged in pro- or anti-Communist attacks, (3) I would not indicate you have been brought in to relieve a bad situation... some way we must solve the Russian problem. It's up to us to find out what makes them tick; why they are what they are; it's not up to us to fight communism. If we try that we have no function; we must expose how it works, what it is what it does, when it fails."

A man who could in 1949 write, "It's not up to us to fight communism," surely should not have been hurt by Chinese Communists. But they wore him down. He returned to the United States.

What intellectual and psychological effect this has had upon Dean, I do not know. Varying reports come out of the State department to the effect that he finds the present situation hopeless because the Chinese Communists are playing for recognition, not for the solution of the Korean question. I have not attempted to confirm these reports because what really matters is whether the State department, in a justifiably desperate desire to get out of the Korean situation, will finally decide to offer Red China recognition in the hope that thus some progress will be made in the negotiations.

Had President Eisenhower mentioned this subject, the response might have been startling.

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